Dublin Gastronomy Symposium

2018 – Food and Power

Liquid Gold: Tapping into the Power Dynamics of Maple Syrup Supply Chains
Brigit Ramsingh

Abstract: In 2012, the Global Strategic Maple Syrup
Reserve in Québec was the site of a major food crime, as
thieves siphoned off 9600 barrels (3,000 tonnes) of ‘liquid
gold’ for counterfeit sale across provincial and state
borders, in what became known as the Great Maple Syrup
Heist. The heist has been characterized as a rebellious
response to the quota controls established by the
Federation of Québec Maple Syrup Producers which has,
since 1990, agreed with its members to hand over any
surplus to ensure stability of supply and pricing. Although
the iconography and imagery of the story of maple syrup
production still heavily draws upon a nostalgic era of the
small farm producer, these events suggest a powerful lobby
which, in the wake of the heist, was branded by some rogue
producers as a maple syrup ‘cartel’ or ‘mafia’. Québec
produces approximately 80% of the world supply, and, to
consolidate its position, the Federation expanded its global
marketing campaign, which in 2017 saw the construction
of a revised and rebranded new set of ‘4 Grades’ based on
translucence, each with associated flavour profiles, and the
creation of a maple flavour wheel, all designed to invoke a
unique Québec maple terroir. In this paper I trace the
historical evolution of Québec maple syrup production and
marketing since the 1930s through the establishment of
the Federation. I consider where power and agency sit — and
has shifted — within this supply chain, taking into consideration
the implications for small-scale producers and consumers.

From August 2011 until July 2012, the Global Strategic
Maple Syrup Reserve in Québec was the site of a major
food crime, as thieves siphoned off 9600 barrels (3,000
tonnes) of ‘liquid gold’ worth $18 million (CAD) for
counterfeit sale across provincial and state borders, in what
became known as the Great Maple Syrup Heist (Hamilton
2016). Under cover of night, and thanks to securing access
to some of the reserve’s key warehouses, the thieves
replaced the syrup with water, volume-for-volume, which
meant the switch was only discovered during an inspection
many months later at one of the storage warehouses in
Saint Louis de Blandford (Cohen 2016). In the end, three
men were charged with hefty fines and prison sentences,
most notably the ‘ring-leader’ Richard Vallières, who was
sentenced to 8 years in prison and fined $9.4 million
(Toronto Star, 2018).
Aside from the obvious sheer opportunism at play, the
heist exposed a simmering war in the industry and has been
characterized by some as a rebellious response to the quota

controls established by the Federation of Québec Maple
Syrup Producers which has, since 1990, agreed with its
members to hand over any surplus to ensure stability of
supply and pricing. Some argue these quotas have spawned
a black market leading to prohibition-style smuggling
across borders, whereas the Federation defends its
‘collective marketing’ system (FPAQ 2018; Hamilton
2016; Skerritt 2016). This example highlights some of the
tensions found within agri-food supply chains and systems,
particularly those espousing norms, values and behaviours
linked to the ‘moral economy of food’ (including, for
example: an emphasis on food producers’ rights to secure
livelihoods and fair pricing, and consumers’ demands for
traceability and knowing where their food comes from) all
of which are influenced by networks of power (Morgan
2007, p. 167). The heist exposes the uneasy coexistence of
collective marketing, the quest for pure and natural
products, the realities of global marketplaces and consumer
demands amidst the neo-liberal desires among (some)
producers for higher profits. Although the iconography
and imagery of the story of maple syrup production still
heavily draws upon a nostalgic era of the small farm
producer, these events suggest a powerful lobby which, in
the wake of the heist, was branded by some rogue producers
as a maple syrup ‘cartel’ or ‘mafia’ (Skerritt 2016).
How did things come this?
This heist and the illicit rogues involved with the theft,
thrust Canada’s maple syrup industry into a limelight of
sorts, or at least earned it a place among the humorous back
pages featuring quirky offbeat stories, and even inspired a
(yet to be produced) film starring Jason Segel (Hertz 2013).
Entertainment factor aside, however, a closer analysis of the
origin and trajectory of the maple syrup industry — which
was at first a maple sugar industry — reveals how its
producers’ collective and cooperative approach is deeply
rooted in efforts to stave off threats from adulteration and
US competitors, establish federal purity legislation and
create an appetite for maple products in domestic markets.
Historical data and analysis reveal a long tradition of
collective and cooperative power among North American
maple producers, including national and provincial groups
within Canada many of whom committed to norms and
values that aimed to protect both producer and consumer.
These associations that were formed in the early twentieth
century adopted the practice of collective marketing and
espoused values and norms that aimed to improve
producers’ outputs, profits and increase their leverage with
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the federal government. In this paper I trace the historical
evolution of Canadian (primarily Québec) maple syrup
production and marketing focusing on the early twentieth
century cooperative organizations that preceded the
Federation. I consider where power and agency sits - and
has shifted - within this supply chain, taking into consideration
the implications for both producers and consumers.
Cooperatives at the turn of the century
Just over 100 years before the heist, the Canadian and
Québec maple syrup industry was having a crisis of a
different sort. The industry was originally focused
primarily on maple sugar — the grainy powdery desiccated
result of boiling off all of the maple sap, rather than leaving
some moisture in the product resulting in a syrup.
Although maple sap, sugar and syrup were known products
and processes for centuries before, the maple sugar industry
coalesced into a viable entity and business for farmers in
the middle of the 19th Century. New export markets had
opened up overseas in Britain and France, and south of the
border in the US demand continued at a steady level.
Maple sugar’s solid cake-like block form, sometimes
referred to as ‘maple concrete’, made for easy transport and
shipping in (for eating) the form of ‘dainty two-ounce
cakes, neatly packed’ or (for cooking) in ‘one and twopound bricks and in pails or tins of ten pounds’ (Perkins
1910). It increasingly found its way into Europe as more
agents and importers cropped up in port cities like
Liverpool, and also made for a nostalgic treat for Canadian
soldiers posted abroad during WWI (Lefebvre 1916).
Maple syrup was lesser known, and also seen as a luxury
item to send to well-to-do friends in one or five-gallon cans
(Lynch 1910). Requests came from importers and agents in
England to the Canadian Deputy Minister of Agriculture
about the potential of developing a demand for it among
English consumers (Watson 1898).
Maple syrup and sugar, both boiled down from the sap
or ‘maple water’ that flows from the trees, can vary in
supply each year depending upon the season and
temperature of the spring thaw. This made for
unpredictable yields depending on the season and climate
which also affected production levels. During the spring
harvest, trees are ‘tapped’ by boring a spout into the bark;
the sap flows out and is collected in pails attached below.
The pressure from the changing temperatures of the spring
thaw, with cool nights and warm sunny days, causes sap to
flow out of the tree, and drip steadily into the buckets.
Buckets would be collected by farmers and poured into
large barrels and transported by sled or horse-drawn sleigh
to the sugar shack or sugar camp for processing. Once in
the sugar shack, sap was poured into large ‘modern’
evaporators and boiled off at the right temperature to create
syrup, or, sugar, and approximately 40 L of sap was needed
to make one litre of maple syrup (Spencer 1913 pp.14–44).

Between 1851–1890, yearly production of maple sugar
in Canada was steadily increasing (from 13.5 million lbs to
22.5 million lbs) but average yields began to decrease
around the turn of the century and eventually dipped to
less than 20 million lbs. As today, the bulk of production
came from Québec (14.3 million lbs at the turn of the
century), with lesser contributions from the neighbouring
provinces of Ontario (5 million lbs), New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia (approximately 0.5 million lbs combined)
(Spencer 1913, p.12).
This dip in production caused alarm among maple sugar
producers. Like in many industries at the time,
adulteration was rampant in maple sugar and syrup
products. It was easy to mix maple sugar with products like
beet and cane sugar, which undermined the profits of those
who kept it pure, and in some instances, it caused many
farmers to give up entirely as it was often more profitable to
chop down trees and sell the maple wood instead (Lefebvre
1916). Although some maple sugar aficionados believed
consumer demand ‘should be higher’ (Grimm 1911) it was
becoming increasingly difficult to compete with much
cheaper cane sugar which had become more readily
available and affordable globally as a regular household and
dietary source of sweetness (Mintz 1986, p. 143).
Near the turn of the century, consumers still saw maple
sugar and syrup as a special luxury item, or many would not
have even heard of the product; it was not an everyday staple
item for the average household. Pure maple sugar and syrup
producers were undercut and undermined by fake cheaper
adulterated blends, often marked by some design ‘suggestive
of the Canadian emblem’ which would leave a bad taste in
the mouths of consumers trying it for the first time (Spencer
1913, p. 45). Those farmers who did have success on a small
scale, would do so by producing a very high-quality product,
building up a reputation through word-of-mouth and
earning their profit through direct sale to consumers. Such
farmers who had a good reputation would see prices in the
range of $1.25 to $2.00 per gallon of syrup, and 12.5 to 30
cents per pound of maple sugar (Spencer 1913, p.46).
The global sugar market had thus become quite
competitive, and this crisis of production prompted
Québec producers to look south for inspiration and to
consider the benefits of collective power. ‘In Union is
Strength’ were the opening words of A.A. Carleton, the
head of the Vermont Maple Sugar Makers’ Association, in
his 1913 address to an audience of Canadian producers
contemplating their existence given the threats to the
industry (Spencer 1913, p. 46). The Vermont group had
existed for about 20 years prior, and was established for
similar reasons, namely, that the industry was in decline
due to the work of ‘mixers’ creating compound goods of
lesser quality (Spencer 1913, p.54).
The Pure Maple Sugar and Syrup Co-Operative
Agricultural Association was established in January 1913
based in Waterloo, Québec, but open to producers in
Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia as well. The

Liquid Gold: Tapping into the Power Dynamics of Maple Syrup Supply Chains

Association had two patrons, and, as an indication of how
much support existed at both the federal and provincial
levels: Honourable Martin Burrell (Canadian Minister of
Agriculture) and the Honourable J. E. Caron, Minister of
Agriculture for the Province of Québec. The honorary
president post was held by Professor John F. Snell, a
chemist from MacDonald College in Québec who had
been conducting research on methods of analysis for
samples of maple syrup (Snell 1920). The President was
M.F. Goddard based in Waterloo; Vice-President was
Chas. F. Fisk of Abbotsford, and the Directors included
John H. Grimm of Montreal, R.T. Brownlee of Hemmingford,
J.A. Dupuis of DesAulnais. The Secretary-Treasurer role
was held by Joseph Lefebvre (Spencer 1913, p 52).
For the annual fee of $1.00, producers could obtain a
membership. The Association established clear objectives
which would attempt to place maple products on both the
political, legislative and social agendas in Canada. First and
foremost, they aimed to put pressure on the governments
of Québec and Canada to change the existing laws to stop
adulteration and the sale of compound syrups using cheaper
and lower quality items which were falsely branded as ‘maple’.
Canada’s first piece of anti-adulteration legislation emerged
in 1874 (‘An Act to Impose License duties on Compounds of
Spirits; to amend the Act respecting the Inland Revenue; and
to prevent the adulteration of Food, Drink and Drugs’) and
was modelled on English laws (Heick 1991, p. 11; Ostry
2006, p 13). Although it had scope to make adulteration
illegal for an array of products, it did not go far enough to
define clear standards, grades or specifications for maple
products. The association also wanted the government to
assist in educating the so-called ‘agricultural classes’ in how
to improve output and quality, and provide educational
lectures, exhibitions and experimental stations to teach young
people and consumers about maple sugar and syrup (Spencer
1913, p. 52). Finally, they wanted the provincial and federal
governments to help the members get markets both at home
and abroad for their products (Spencer 1913, p. 52).
The Association strongly advocated the idea of
‘Cooperative marketing’ (See Figure 1). In its first year,
approximately 5,000 gallons of syrup and ‘a considerable
amount of sugar’ was handled by the association, and
‘satisfactory prices’ were obtained (Spencer 1913, p. 47). The
aim was to do away with competition which drove prices
down and put producers at a disadvantage. At that time in
Canada, it was estimated that there were approximately
55,000 sugar factories capable of making maple sugar or
syrup but the association was concerned that it wasn’t
meeting its potential, and there was money to be made
(Lefebvre 1916, p. 20). It wished to ‘do the same for the
[maple] sugar industry as for dairy and cattle breeding.’
(Lefebvre 1916.) In an impassioned speech at their 1916
meeting the Member of Parliament for Vaudreuil, Gustave
Boyer, reminded the assembly that ‘the essential condition
for reaching the desired success quickly is the community:
cooperation of goodwill and ideas’ (Lefebvre 1916). The
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advantages to the working or ‘agricultural classes’ were
emphasised: ‘In any section of the industrial world, when
the success of the working classes was desired, the first thing
was to unite in a body, and the latter then, championing all,
would begin the struggle.’ (Lefebvre 1916).
Part of the struggle with maple products, then, was to
improve output and stamp out adulteration. One strategy
to meet these threats was to improve the quality of maple
sugar and maple syrup by introducing grades and
standards, and modernising equipment, as a way to protect
both producer and consumer from the ‘speculator and
middle man’ because as many advocates for pure maple
sugar knew, pounds would magically get added to the
product as it flowed into cities (Spencer 1913, p. 56).
Adulteration and purity
The declining productivity of the maple syrup industry was
very much linked to the ‘devilish’ and ‘evil’ problem of

Figure 1. Label authorised by the Maple Sugar and Syrup
Cooperative Agricultural Association. (Source: Spencer, J.B.
(1913). The Maple Sugar Industry in Canada. Bulletin No. 2B
Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau. Library and Archives
Canada. Ottawa.)
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adulteration and concerns over product quality (Grimm
1911). Although the nineteenth century heyday of
adulteration was quelled somewhat by pure food laws in
both the US (1906) and Canada (1874), it was still in
fashion well into the twentieth century. Products which
were not necessarily injurious to health, but still
misleading, such as adding yellow to margarine to mask as
butter (and thereby offering a cheaper alternative)
paralleled some of the debates and concerns found among
producers in the maple industry (Dupré 1999; Heick 1991).
At the end of the nineteenth century, glucose could be had
at less than two cents a pound, granulated sugar at four
cents a pound, while syrup sold direct from producers at
about one dollar per gallon. It was hard to argue against the
cheaper alternative offered to consumers through
compound or flavoured products, and with competing
sweet options on the market such as glucose, molasses and
cane sugar, one way to position maple sugar and syrup was
that as a ‘luxury item’ for ‘discriminating customers’
(Spencer 1913, p 45). But as the Canadian Deputy Minister
of Agriculture warned British enquirers about the state of
Canadian maple products, it was ‘difficult for most of the
manufacturers to withstand the temptation [to adulterate]’
(Parmelee 1898).
Maple sugar could be easily mixed with cheaper cane or
beet sugar, or other powdery substances, such as chalk or
Blanc d’Espagne, a calcium carbonate and clay powder
mixture (Lefevbre, 1916). Maple syrup could be mixed
with darker grades or water, or in some cases molasses
(Grimm 1911). Some mixers created a compound using an
alternative substance called ‘mapeleine’ (maple flavour)
that, when one ounce was mixed with a gallon of molasses,
produced a so-called ‘delicious syrup’ (Grimm 1911, p. 4).
A series of investigations conducted by the Department of
Inland Revenue’s Chief Dominion Analyst Thomas
MacFarlane in 1906 and again in 1908 at the point of retail
sale showed that the samples taken by inspectors found
adulteration to be rampant. In 1906, of 85 maple syrups
sampled from the four main provinces (but selling
products originating and processed by manufacturers in
both the US and Canada), only 22 were ‘genuine’, 2
‘doubtful’, 8 had ‘declared adulteration’ on the label, and
53 were found to be adulterated; of the 26 maple sugars,
only 11 were found to be ‘genuine’ (MacFarlane 1906).
Inspection of samples was governed under the remit of
the Adulteration Act. The cooperative, however, felt it
didn’t go far enough to protect maple products, and the
3200-strong membership petitioned the Minister of
Agriculture to provide greater regulatory protection which
would require analysts to confirm the sugar content of
so-called ‘maple products’ (Grimm 1911, p. 20). The
minister argued that it was too difficult to test but Grimm,
one of the Coop’s directors, argued that at the
manufacturing plants it was possible.
Producers were selling their product increasingly less
and less direct to consumers and instead going through

powerful wholesalers, factories and retailers such as George
Cary in Vermont, the Imperial Syrup Co. in Montreal, or
The New England Maple Sugar Co. in Boston, or, the
Québec Maple Sugar Producers’ Society established its first
plant and warehouse in Plessisville (MacFarlane 1906). The
advent of large bulk transport barrels made this possible;
these could be loaded up at the farms’ sugar shacks and
shipped by freight train to cities like Montreal or similar
cities south of the border where wholesalers and retailers
congregated. Although the barrels helped facilitate and
create new market opportunities for producers, they also
caused problems as these were uninspected and ungraded
at both the point of collection and at the wholesalers,
leaving much room for mislabelling or mixing of its
contents. Producers and farmers committed to selling a
pure product were being undermined; power had thus
come to rest in the hands of the manufacturers and
wholesalers, the ‘mixers’ as some cynically referred to these
actors further along the maple product supply chains
(Spencer 1913, p. 46).
The cooperatives fought back against this development.
Drawing on its collective marketing and bargaining power,
it sought to improve the overall quality, provide education
and create standards. The Québec producers created its
own set of grades for sugar: ‘Choice’, No. 1, No. 2 and No.
3, each in increasing darkness and robust flavour. No. 2
and 3 would be used for making sugar for baking or sent to
the tobacco industry for mixing with cigarettes (Québec
Maple Sugar Producers 1920, p. 10).
A powerful figure that emerged during this time was
John Grimm, who, as mentioned above, was one of the five
first Directors of the Pure Maple Sugar and Syrup Cooperative Agricultural Association, and owner of Grimm
Manufacturing in Montreal — a maker of industrial maple
sugar and syrup processing equipment such as evaporators.
In addition to passionately preaching against the existence
of ‘bogus maple syrups and sugars’, improving quality and
establishing grades, he was also a strong advocate for
collective marketing of maple sugar and syrup (Grimm
1911). In 1913 Grimm organized a maple sugar and syrup
contest in Montreal and strongly lobbied the federal
government for the need for greater legislation. (Spencer
1913, p.57). The collective petitioned the federal
government to establish an Act that would govern the
maple syrup industry, and enshrine specifications and
definitions of the word maple in the rule of law. Eventually,
after consultation on a draft with people like Grimm,
tobacco manufacturers (invested in the darker grade sugar
for their products), the coops and retailers, the Maple Sugar
Industry Act (and its regulations) came into force in 1931.
Strict specifications were to become enshrined in the
Act. Overall, all grades of syrup had to weigh 13 lbs 2
ounces per gallon and contain no more than 35 percent
water. ‘Canada Fancy’ was very light amber or straw
coloured with a characteristic maple flavour, free from any
fermentation; ‘Canada Light’ was light amber and straw
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coloured; ‘Canada medium’ was to be slightly darker amber
or straw and finally, ‘Canada Dark’ was darker in colour
than medium and (unlike the other 3 grades) trace
fermentation or ‘sappiness’ flavour was permitted
(Department of Agriculture 1931, Section 12). Sugar
grades were also similarly defined and graded in the Act: all
must consist of entirely solid or pulverised product
resulting from the evaporation of maple sap or syrup and
contain no more than 10% water, each with a designation
of either ‘Canada Light’, ‘Canada Medium’ and ‘Canada
Dark’. (Department of Agriculture 1931, Section 13 (1)).
Despite the Act in force as of 1931, the maple industry
continued to be ‘menaced!’ as the Act wasn’t being properly
enforced, and adulterated products continued to flow
through the supply chains. Again, this caused more crisis,
as an anonymous bulletin featuring Grimm’s visage
prominently on the front page and seemingly aimed at
consumers and producers screamed out headlines that
‘55,000 Canadian farmers [were] being robbed of a real
asset’ and it was the fault of the department of health for
not inspecting and testing enough samples and enforcing
the law (Maple Industry Is Menaced 1928). The
anonymous author of this bulletin appeared to have great
insider industry knowledge and connections to the point of
even being able to have placed on one occasion a sample of
adulterated maple sugar directly in the hands of the
Minister of Health, a ‘black, grimy, rank to the taste…
dreadful apology for maple product.’ (Maple Industry is
Menaced 1928). At the time the industry was valued at
eight million dollars per annum; adulteration meant
money was being lost, farmers and consumers were
continuing to be ‘swindled’ and cheated and the whole
industry was ‘undermined’ by adulteration (Maple
Industry is Menaced 1928).
The Cooperatives called upon producers to lobby the
government and MPs and demand that the regulations be
enforced and more inspectors get trained up and sent out;
they appealed to a sense of national unity and pride and
that taking action meant to ‘be a builder-up, not a tearerdown of Canada.’ (Maple Industry is Menaced 1928). Part
of the problem was finding suitable inspectors. Many
inspectors and analysts from the government Fruit Branch
were enlisted, but few had the expertise in maple products
to identify and test for real or fake products out in the field
or the sugar groves. Tests had been developed thanks to a
strong research program emanating from Montreal and
McGill University into the science of maple products, but
weren’t in widespread use. Testing for adulteration by cane
or other sugars was tricky because the same constituent
components found in granulated sugar was identical to the
pure sugar components of maple syrup (Snell 1913, p. 740).
Testing for other components unique to maple syrup such
as malic acid as well as for alkaline values of ash (the
remaining inorganic components once the organic parts
have been burnt off), along with lead values, or the ‘lead
test’ were some of the ways for an analyst to determine if a
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maple product had been adulterated (Snell 1913, p. 740). It
was tricky, however, and few analysts had training in these
techniques and methods of detection as tests were still
being developed by agricultural chemists. Moreover,
inspectors were only learning about the differences in the
new established grades. Part of the problem was also the
point of inspection. As Grimm argued, testing at the site of
production was not enough: it was a much better idea to
test at the site of the wholesalers and retailers where mixing
would be more likely to occur (Grimm 1929). The Minister
of Agriculture assured Vaillaincourt of the Québec coop
that he was working on finding ‘a capable research man’
(Grisdale, 1928).
Once again the Cooperation launched a powerful lobby
to the Canadian federal government, in conjunction with
equivalent organizations in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia,
Québec and Ontario, petitioning for stricter controls on
maple syrup purity and stricter fines for adulteration,
better capacity for inspection and enforcement. This
included the requesting graders for syrups produced by
‘dealers’ (wholesalers) each spring in order to ‘protect both
the farmer and purchasers’ (Vaillaincourt 1936). The
federal government sent inspectors from their fruit branch
to do surprise ‘bush inspections’, but many producers
argued that more could be done at the packing,
wholesaling and retail levels (Gardiner 1936). The
cooperatives pushed for more: The New Brunswick Maple
Sugar Producers Association passed a resolution requesting
that the Act be revised to insist that 4 grades be mandatory
on labels for inter-provincial trade; once Québec cooperatives
got involved with the lobbying, the federal government
responded with revisions to the Act (Clark 1936).
Meanwhile, as the Canadian industry headed toward
stricter purity, grades and standards, south of the border
Grimm’s equally vociferous counterpart, if not a foil in this
maple syrup drama, was the wholesaler George Cary, of
Cary Maple Sugar Company in Vermont. At the time the
largest ‘dealer in the world’ and ‘preacher for purity’ Cary
wrote to the Canadian Minister of Agriculture suggesting
that Canadian farmers were in the ‘habit of cheating’ and
insisted that there wasn’t a demand for the lighter grades
among consumers (Cary 1928). He also criticized the
‘attitude’ of the Cooperative in Québec and Plessisville for
‘hurting’ the industry. The Cooperative had begun to also
subsidize producers, which Cary said forced him to buy up
cheap Canadian products (and re-sell these) just to remain
competitive. Cary said that Canadian pure products were
far ‘too cheap’ and even lobbied the House of
Representatives in the US to raise the tariff on Canadian
maple sugar to ten cents per pound, and on syrup to six
cents per pound (Montreal Daily Star 1929).
The ‘preacher of purity’ was, somewhat ironically,
caught up in litigation with Maine producers, and evidence
showed he in fact supplied them with cane sugar so that
they could adulterate their maple products (Payne 1928).
In the wake of this threat from an American increase on
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involved telling the story of the
production process, the maple
groves, the flowing of the sap and
the general romance of the sugar
bush and maple harvesting season,
especially the ‘sugaring off’ parties
where the ‘amorous instincts of
the budding youths’ might be
awakened (Spencer 1913, p. 12;
Vaillaincourt 1927, pp. 3–7). A
nutrition and health angle was
used to market maple products as
being ‘pure’ sugar as opposed to
the cheaper ‘refined’ cane sugar or
molasses. Maple sugar and syrup
Figure 2. Windsor Station Room 351 Maple Syrup Marketing c. 1935. (Source:
was presented as being more
Library and Archives Canada, Department of Agriculture. RG 20 Vol. 311. Ottawa.)
calorific and hence of higher value
maple duties, Grimm felt this was an opportunity for
with a total of 75 calories in one tablespoon, as opposed to
Canadian farmers to ‘clean up a little bit’ and make a
63 calories in cane sugar or molasses, or 57.5 calories in
quality of sugar ‘better than the class of sugar that Cary
corn syrup (Maple Sugar Producers of Québec 1920, p. 13).
likes to ship to the US.’ (Grimm 1929). Grimm wrote to
It was also marketed as a good source of iron which would
the federal minister of agriculture suggesting the need to
be of benefit to ‘anaemic persons’ (Maple Sugar Producers
‘help ourselves and help the farmer’ and ‘obtain a market
of Québec 1920, p. 14).
for maple syrup and sugar at home.’ (Grimm 1929).
Because of the problems outlined by Grimm, namely the
lack of enforcement of the new maple industry regulations,
the looming US tariff rise and inevitable drop in exports,
the Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Minister agreed
that something had to be done to avert another maple
industry crisis; Martin urged that it was time that ‘we must
foster the sale of the pure product among our own people’
(Martin 1929). As one producer put it, ‘it has been
suggested that we advertise in England, why not work our
own country first?’ (Jenne 1928).
Marketing of maple products
By the mid-1930s, with the legislative clout of the new
maple sugar act, the Québec producers lobbied the
Canadian federal department of Agriculture as well as the
department of trade to help with the marketing of products
both at home and abroad. The harvest in 1934 and 1935
was particularly heavy and producers were ‘flooded’ in
syrup (Pryce 1935). Having taken the stand for purity
against their American counterparts, Canadian producers
with the support of the federal government, embarked
upon an ambitious advertising campaign to promote maple
syrup and sugar products to domestic audiences. There
were still calls for finding markets in the US and well as
overseas in the United Kingdom, however the more expensive
cost of Canadian sugar put British consumers off (Skinner 1935).
The marketing of maple syrup began in earnest in the
1920s, led predominantly by the large collective of Québec
Maple Sugar Producers’ Society, but with support from
their provincial and national counterparts. The messaging

Figure 3. ‘The Safe Sweet for Children!’ c. 1935. (Source: Library
and Archives Canada. Department of Agriculture,
RG 20 Vol. 311. Ottawa.)
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In 1934 the federal government agreed to spend $5000
toward a marketing campaign which would result in a
series of adverts in popular magazines and papers across the
country, special displays at railway stations, and
educational events aimed at schools, such as maple syrup
‘essay writing contests’ (Adams 1934; and see Figure 2). As
part of this campaign, the healthfulness of maple syrup was
invoked as a reason to make it a part of a child’s ‘daily diet’
as the ‘safe sweet for children’ which was also good for
them (See Figure 3). Moreover, maple products were to be
trusted as they were pure and protected by the Dominion
Government, with quality guaranteed from ‘the tapped
tree to your table’ (See Figure 3).
The cooperatives also enlisted the help of housewives
and women’s institutes to contribute ideas on how to use
maple products in the home. Maple recipes were
distributed in short pamphlets containing photos and
instructions on how to construct an array of maple-based
delights such as maple blanc-mange, maple candied rice,
maple peanut brittle, and prunes in maple syrup (Maple
Sugar Producers of Québec 1920). Consumer feedback and
tastes, however, started to show a preference toward syrup
more so than the hard and awkward sugar blocks, whom
some felt resembled ‘common laundry soap’ and couldn’t
compete with chocolate bars retailing at 75 cents to a dollar
in the shops (Adams 1934). Gradually the coarse, dark,
unattractive blocks of maple ‘cement’ started to make way
for the more luxurious, fine and pure maple syrup.
Conclusion
The collective marketing of maple syrup by powerful
cooperative groups continued throughout the rest of the
twentieth century, and from the 1930s onward Canada
began to eclipse the US in terms of worldwide production.
By the 1960s, maple sugar as a product almost disappeared
entirely and producers focused mainly on syrup, although
some niche gourmet products have been developed or
retained. The Federation of Québec Maple Syrup Producers
was officially established in 1966, and in 1975 the
International Maple Syrup Institute (ISMI) was created to
represent cross-border interests of Canadian and American
producers. Québec produces approximately 80% of the
world supply, and, to consolidate its strength, the
Federation has continued to expand its global collective
marketing campaign, which resulted in the creation of a
maple flavour wheel in 2004, and in 2017 the construction
at a national level of a revised and rebranded new set of ‘4
Grades’ based on translucence and each with associated
flavour profiles, all designed to invoke a unique Québec
maple terroir (Moriniaux 2007). A high level of consumer
protection has been established, although the benefits of
maple syrup may be more culinary than healthy. But what
about the protection for farmers, the ‘agricultural classes’
and the norms and values established and embedded
within these powerful networks at the start of the
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twentieth century? Although a smaller heist occurred in
2016, the FPAQ has recently confirmed that the quota
system is being revisited to improve benefits for producers,
and it is looking to expand production by adding five
million taps after a record season in 2017 (FPAQ, 2018).
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